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

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THE WAR IN THE PACIFIC.

MR. CLEMENTS MARKHAM AND SEÑOR GARCIA Y GARCIA AS HISTORIANS.

(REMARKS BY AN OLD WEST-COASTER).

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THE WAR IN THE PACIFIC.

MR. CLEMENTS MARKHAM & SEÑOR GARCIA Y GARCIA AS HISTORIANS.

(REMARKS BY AN OLD WEST-COASTER.)

To the Editor of "Standard."

Sir,—I see that Don Aurelio Garcia, a Peruvian diplomatist, who at one time held a commission in the navy of his country, and who is well known to the South American "Colony" in London as "the captain that was made a *rear* admiral because he never came to the *front*," has sent the "Times" a letter on the subject of the war between Chili and Peru, a communication which the editor of that paper, to a certain extent, appears to have considered to contain correct statements, although admitting in a "leader" of the 1st instant, that "the Peruvian in question writes with "the passion of a man who has seen his "country ruined and his life wrecked by "Chili." I find also that Mr. Markham, an English scientist, who is in love with Peru on account of the rich field for antiquarian researches the latter country afforded him many years ago, took upon himself the task, last year, of playing the historian of the war just mentioned, if one may be allowed to style historian a writer who openly avows himself a champion of the cause of one of the belligerents, the Peruvians, although he has no personal knowledge of the matter at issue, and although he, by consulting his own brother, Captain Markham, R.N., his friend, Commander Acland, R.N., and by studying the extensive reports which these officers and others in command of H.M.'s vessels on the Pacific station, have furnished to the Admiralty, during the war mentioned, easily could have learnt that his self-imposed championship was "on the wrong side," and unworthy of his antecedents as a student and scientist, however grateful he might be to the Peruvian Government for having given him the facilities that led to Her Majesty making him a "Companion of Bath." Mr. Markham's declamations in favour of Peru, which by the bye, have disappointed most of his literary friends, happened to come under the notice of the Editor of the "Times," just at the time when a Peruvian diplomatist wrote to the same paper a passionate letter, replete with misstatements, and containing so exaggerated a version of the unfortunate affairs in Peru that it would occupy too much space, were I to notice, one by one, all the items which are given by him as facts, but which by the Anglo-Peruvians and Anglo-Chilians in London, are merely admitted as "one sided, ridiculous, and absurd statements," partaking of the character of the reports the Peruvian Government used to publish in Lima after the loss of the respective battles, reports which invariably described every loss as a splendid victory, and always wound up by engaging "completely to "annihilate, within a few days, the Chilian "vultures, whose blood shortly would be "seen to run in streams through the Peru-"vian valleys," some of which reports I have preserved as literary and historical curiosities, affording, besides, much theme for reflection to an anthropological student as illustrations of the worst side of human nature, accidentally exposed to view.

It is feared that Mr. Markham's position in London has predisposed the "Times" to accept as infallible *his* opinion, and that the letter from the Peruvian diplomatist above referred to has received more attention at the Editor's hands than would have fallen to its share, had it not reached him precisely while he was reviewing Mr. Markham's book, and thought he safely could accept an F.R.S., F.R.G.S., C.B., etc., as an authority on the subject of the war in question, especially since the editor himself had had no opportunity to learn how effectively the work named is disposed of by the able Chilian writer Benjamin V. Mackenna, in his recent critical digest of it; in connection with which it must be borne in mind that Mr. Markham in his book specially mentions Mackenna as one of the ablest and most conscientious historians, and that still it is this very writer who condemns Mr. Markham's book as unreliable, one-sided, incomplete, and unfair. It is also supposed that, in reviewing the latter work, it escaped the "Times" for the

moment that Mr. Markham does not appear to have consulted the Blue-Books which contain the reports of his brother, Captain Albert Markham, R.N., and Commander Acland, R.N., who were specially commissioned by the Admiralty to gather information *in situ* about the war referred to, and who, with the frankness and straightforwardness that are characteristic of British naval officers, give their verdict in favour of the Chilians without any hesitation.

As far as I am concerned, I am equally interested in the welfare and progress of Peru, Bolivia, and Chili, in which countries I have spent sixteen years, during the latter quarter of which space of time I had special opportunities, in the disputed territory, for hearing on the spot the different versions of the dispute; and in many a discussion, in social intercourse in the interior of Bolivia, the questions that led to the war have been submitted to me as an impartial outsider to pronounce my opinion on, the pleading parties in some cases being able barristers, several of whom had been ministers of state, all Bolivians and Peruvians, some attacking and some upholding the Chilian rights and the policy based thereon, while more than once I have heard the Dictator Melgarejo and his talented Premier, Muñoz, who on behalf of Bolivia concluded the treaty of limits in 1866, warmly defend Chili and her claims.

As on all those occasions and after hearing the exhaustive arguments by both sides, instead of the incomplete one-sided ones adduced by Mr. Markham, no finding was come to, nor could be come to, logically, but in favour of Chili I must protest against the views given expression to by Mr. Clements Markham in his book lately published, and by Señor Garcia in his letter to the "Times" of the 30th April, and base my protest on the following, which is capable of being proved in the most ample manner, viz.:—

First. — Ever since her independence (1818) Chili has claimed that the "Desert of Atacama" was subject to her sovereignty, founding her claim on Spanish historical documents, some of royal and others of vice-regal origin, photographs of which were exhibited to the Bolivian President, when later on a treaty had to be discussed, they were examined by his Prime Minister and compared with copies of the Peruvian records, with the "Laws of the Indies" with the maps of Ondarza, Rochette, Bustamante, Malespina, and others, as well as confronted with a valuable collection of documents bearing on the subject and still existing in the Bolivian University of Sucre. Although Chili on her official maps only showed the northern boundary of Chili proper and not that of the almost unpopulated dependency, the desert, Paposo being for a long time the last port to the north where the Chilian flag was permanently displayed, nevertheless she clearly had, in a variety of ways, exercised acts of sovereignty over the littoral of the Desert. North of Paposo miners were working copper and silver mines, with Chilian licenses, before the treaty of 1866 was made; vessels from Chili had for fifteen years loaded phosphate of lime from the Morro of Mejillones, inside point Angamos, at about the 23rd parallel S., with Chilian Custom House permits and frequently with Chilian Custom House officers on board, while also several official expeditions sent by Chili, explored minutely, and for a considerable space of time, the desert of Atacama and the littoral referred to, having by the Bolivians tacitly been admitted to be on soil subject to Chilian sovereignty, permitted to display, in several places on shore, the national flag of Chili, and not interfered with in any way. These circumstances, as well as an examination of all the historical documents, coupled with the conviction on the part of the Melgarejo-Muñoz Government that the desert of Atacama and the littoral would be more thoroughly explored and worked if the disputes were settled which arose when Bolivia also started granting loading permits for phosphate of lime cargoes, determined the Bolivian dictator finally to conclude the treaty of 1866 with Chili, establishing what the treaty calls a "mixed territory" in the 24th and 25th degrees of southern latitude, *i.e.*, from the 23rd to the 25th parallel, with Bolivian sovereignty, but Chilian fiscal intervention and participation in Bolivian customs and other revenue collected in the territory from the 23rd to the 24th parallel, and with Chilian sovereignty but Bolivian fiscal intervention and participation in Chilian revenue within the 24th degree, or from the 24th to the 25th parallel of southern latitude, thus in reality not advancing the boundary line of Chili proper, but creating a fresh geographical territory, with reciprocal rights on the part of the two nations exercising sovereignty, a kind of politically mixed zone, owned by Chili and Bolivia on certain terms of partnership. This

treaty was not in Santiago viewed as conferring on Chili any fresh national territory, for the Chilians did not consider that, however much a dependency, the littoral from the 25th to the 24th parallel could under this treaty be called part of Chili proper, inasmuch as Bolivian fiscal intervention had to be submitted to, thus to a certain extent vitiating the Chilian sovereignty. However, after some considerable opposition in Congress, the treaty, although not palatable, was approved of, chiefly because Chili did not wish Bolivia to become an ally of Spain, with which latter country Chili and Peru were then at war (1866).

Second: Mr. Markham's statement that the treaty of 1866 was refused ratification by Bolivia, is completely incorrect. In the first place, General Melgarejo, who with his Premier signed it, had supreme power as Dictator of Bolivia, and the treaty would have been binding on his country, and could not be rejected by the Congress that had granted him his powers as a Dictator. But it is, moreover, an incontrovertible fact that the first Legislative Assembly to which Melgarejo gave an account of the acts of his Dictatorship, took full cognizance of the treaty referred to, and passed it although it required no special approval. Ratifications were exchanged, and the consummation of this international covenant took place, inasmuch as the treaty was put into practical operation, and abided by for about five years, during the existence of the Melgarejo Government, whose acts were discussed by every Congress in the manner then usual in Bolivia. It is true that, about six years after the consummation of this treaty, the Legislative Assembly of Bolivia passed a Government Bill, introduced by President Morales, providing in a general way for a revocation or disavowal of all the bills passed during the Melgarejo Government. This, however, could not possibly apply to an international obligation, but merely to concessions, appointments, and decrees of mere domestic character; whereas, on the contrary, the treaty continued in force, and the Chilian interventor and a Chilian man-of-war continued to be stationed at Mejillones, the northernmost port of the so-called "mixed territory," with no legal change attempted until the end of 1872, when a supplementary or explanatory protocol was signed between Chili and Bolivia; the approval of this protocol was never refused, but delayed somewhat or postponed, and finally both the supplementary treaty and the original one of 1866, were altered or modified by a fresh treaty with the Bolivian Government, dated the 6th August, 1874, Doctor Frias, a statesman of high repute for integrity, being then President of Bolivia, and this final treaty, which was in force when the war broke out, was approved both by the Bolivian Legislative Assembly and by the Congress of Chili. It provided for a remission of part of certain fiscal duties, a concession in favour of Bolivia, and stipulated that, for twenty-five years, certain export duties, to be levied between the 23rd and 25th parallels, should not be higher than those in force when signing the treaty.

Third: The upright and patriotic Dr. Frias was succeeded in the Bolivian Presidency by General Daza, a revolutionary chief of the worst type, who, from a waiter in a *posada* had become a tailor's journeyman, and at length enlisted as a soldier, advancing in a few years from a "full private" to a general of division through intrigues and treachery, and who, finally, by means of the troops confided to his charge, deposed the constitutional President. This revolutionary leader, Daza, initiated his career by declaring null and void the acts of the Doctor Frias Administration, and by raising the export duty on nitrate of soda, which latter substance was being largely exported from the "Mixed Territory" by a Chilian Joint Stock Company, from which Company the Bolivian Custom House at once demanded the considerable sum of £18,000 for increase of duties, in direct violation of the treaty between the two countries, which international engagement the new Bolivian Government probably would not have ventured to break but for the rumours then current, that the Argentine Confederation was going to declare war against Chili, to get possession of part of Patagonia; Bolivia, moreover, in view of a secret treaty with Peru, was sure of Peruvian assistance in the event of a war with Chili, and had been prevailed on by Peru to effect the above-mentioned change in the duty on nitrate of soda. This change in the tariffs, while benefitting the Bolivian Treasury, in defiance of an international treaty, was calculated to enable Peru to maintain a high price on the markets of the world for the so-called Pacific saltpetre, which in Peru had been made a Government monopoly, the principal com-

petitor of which was the Chilian Company just referred to. Although not prepared to go to war, and being inhabited by a quiet, laborious nation, Chili, however, demanded of Bolivia full compliance with the treaty which regulated the export duty, but which was violated by the new Bolivian tariff, proclaimed at the instigation of Peru, as already said.

The rumours of war between Chili and the Argentine Confederation had, meanwhile, subsided somewhat, and Bolivia, evidently afraid of a direct breach of the treaty with Chili, and seeing the firm attitude of the Chilian Plenipotentiary, repealed or annulled the decree that increased the duty on nitrate of soda. This did, however, not suit Peru, and she shortly afterwards prevailed on Bolivia at once to cancel the original concession, in virtue of which the Chilian Company had spent one and a-half million pounds sterling to properly work the nitrate of soda deposits near Antofagasta, a concession which had been obtained for a valuable consideration, and which had been ratified by Congress, but which now, to suit Peru, was to be changed into a temporary short lease, and be put up to auction on such terms that none but the Government of Bolivia could become the purchaser, and this, naturally, at a price which would be ruinous to the Chilian Company.

The result of this conspiracy would be to Peru that she, acting in concert with Bolivia, would be able to control the price of nitrate of soda, and probably also to "rig" the guano market, these two substances competing as bases for artificial fertilizers, and both being State monopolies in Peru; this result would also seriously interfere with the value of the phosphatic guano found at Mejillones, of which Chili owned one half, and would reduce to a mere shadow the substantial security Chili thought she, by the Treaty of 1874, had obtained for the Antofagasta or "Salar del Carmen" Nitrate Company, and for which fancied security, the only advantage accruing to her under the new treaty, she had paid a very high price in ceding to Bolivia all claim on the customs' revenue derived from the old treaty.

I may here observe that Mr. Markham considers that Chili, by the Treaty of 1874, obtained still another great advantage, that of getting goods from Chili introduced into Bolivia free of duty; but this was, in reality, no concession in favour of Chili; for the Treaty on this point only refers to Chilian produce, certain comestibles and fodder, articles which, by the very tariff ruling in Bolivia already, were exempt from duty, and never were likely to become subject to fiscal charges, they being absolutely required there, and having no indigenous or Bolivian goods to compete with.

The Chilian Nitrate Company above mentioned, however, had to suspend operations, owing to the intrigues of Bolivia and Peru; about 2,000 Chilian labourers, in consequence thereof, suddenly found themselves out of employment in the Desert of Atacama, and fears were entertained that they would massacre the few Bolivian authorities there existing and commit other excesses; a warrant for the arrest of the Manager of the Chilian Nitrate Company had been issued by the Bolivian authorities, and the day had been fixed for the sale by auction of the Company's entire property, decreed by the Bolivian Prefect in charge of the littoral; then the Chilian Government could no longer shut their eyes to the fact that, to maintain order and to stop the spoliation of the goods and chattels of Chilian subjects, it would be necessary to intervene promptly with armed force; it also dawning finally on the Cabinet of Santiago that the attitude of Bolivia, in confiscating the property, was neither more nor less than the violation of the Treaty in another and much worse form than that attempted on the previous occasion, when merely an increase of the fiscal charges or taxes on that same property had been demanded. A small force of 500 Chilian soldiers was immediately despatched to Antofagasta, the Bolivians fled, and the Chilians, without firing a shot, took possession of the Bolivian littoral, thus "nipping in the bud" the scheme of her two intriguing neighbours, Bolivia and Peru. The former of these Republics retaliated by declaring war against Chili, issued letters of marque, ordered the expulsion of all Chilians, and confiscated their property, whereas Chili continued to allow the Bolivians equal rights with Chilian citizens. The population of the Bolivian littoral, of which eighty-five per cent. were Chilians, addressed the Chilian Government, praying that the Desert of Atacama and the littoral be formally and finally incorporated in Chili proper, and temporary Chilian Judges and other functionaries were being appointed, when Peru, although bound by a Secret Treaty with Bolivia to declare war against Chili, sent a Plenipotentiary

to the capital of the latter country, ostensibly offering her good offices as a mediator of peace. This, no doubt, was done to gain time to complete her preparations for war by purchases in Europe and the United States, which neither her secret ally, Bolivia, nor Chili could effect with freedom, since war had been declared by Bolivia against Chili. The Chilian Government, which had heard persistently repeated, but never believed, rumours of the existence of the above-mentioned secret treaty, thought the occasion required that she should demand whether such treaty existed, and that Peru should at once declare whether she would remain neutral or not in the Chilian-Bolivian struggle. After the Peruvian Plenipotentiary first proclaiming ignorance of and afterwards admitting the existence of an alliance between his country and Bolivia, and the telegraph every day bringing more and more news of Peru's active armaments, Chili at length, about seven weeks after landing her troops in Antofagasta, and after some five weeks' negotiations with the Peruvian Ambassador, found it necessary for her own safety's sake, to declare war against Peru, a step which, moreover, was demanded by the general indignation existing all over Chili against the Lima Government for conspiring with Bolivia in the manner told. Peru replied by accepting the challenge, and by ordering all private Chilian citizens to leave the Peruvian territory, confiscating their property, and tacitly sanctioning, or at all events not repressing, the terrible excesses against Chilians, men, women, and children, which became of daily occurrence in Peru—excesses which, however, were not to be wondered at, when one has seen the brothers Gutierrez, in the civilised (?) capital, Lima, hoisted up the spire of the cathedral, let down by the run, cut into small pieces, of which some by the Peruvians were cooked and eaten, others burnt and the ashes drunk in the national beverage *chicha*.

It has been asserted that the nitrate deposits at Tarapaca were the real cause of the war; this is only true inasmuch as either their possession, their working, or the sale of their product by the Peruvian Government, coupled with the circumstance of the competing fertiliser, guano, also being a State monopoly in Peru, caused the latter country to intrigue with Bolivia to get the nitrate deposits in the desert of Atacama taken away from the concessionaires and declared the property of the State as in Peru, as well as for the purpose of getting Bolivia to break the treaty of limits with Chili, and, *vi et armis*, claim entire possession of the guano deposits in the littoral of the same desert, so that, once both fertilisers, nitrates and phosphates, in the hands of the Bolivian Government, Peru might, in concert with her ally Bolivia, regulate the market price of all guano and of all nitrate of soda exported from the whole of the west coast of South America. When Peru's various schemes in Tarapaca were put in force to expropriate the nitrate deposits of the Chilian and other concessionaires, a great deal of indignation was felt in Chili, as well as in England, France, and Germany; but when part of the press and all the Chilian Companies that suffered by the expropriation and monopoly schemes of Peru, urged the Government of Santiago to interfere actively in favour of the Tarapaca concessionaires, the Chilian Cabinet, however, referred the latter to the Peruvian tribunals, and positively refused to move actively in the matter unless some other Government would support their subjects or citizens in the like manner. Chili, be it remembered, had never claimed any right to the province of Tarapaca, but, on the contrary, respected Peru's sovereignty, however much abused. She therefore naturally was very loth to do anything outside of the sphere of a diplomatic correspondence, recommending the cases of her citizens to the due consideration of the Peruvian Government. The complaints that reached Chili from the territory of which she had dispossessed herself, ceding it to Bolivia in a conditional manner set forth in the treaty *ad hoc*, were, however, of a far different nature; for they revealed either a direct breach of the treaty of 6th of August, 1874, which had been approved of by the Bolivian Congress that closed its labours in November same year, or they denounced flagrant acts of injustice to Chilian citizens, committed in a territory which was subject to the jurisdiction of Chili before ceded by her to Bolivia, and the dwellers in which, it was considered, had at least a moral right to expect that Chili would, on dispossessing herself of the territory, see that the new sovereign of the soil, Bolivia, treated them no worse than their old master, Chili, whose laws protected them in the desert of Atacama when they had settled there prior to the treaty having been made.

The Chilian Government also very naturally considered, that if Bolivia broke

the treaty, then Chili's old sovereignty over the territory revived.

That this sovereignty originally was founded on just and good titles, I had once occasion to satisfy myself about by personal investigation, being interested in landed property situated on the west coast of South America, between the 23rd and 25th parallel; I then found the following items specially in favour of Chili's claim, viz. :—

(*a.*) Pedro Cieza de Leon, in the first volume of his work, "Cronica del Peru," published in 1553, and the Ynca Garcilaza de la Vega, in his "Comentarios Reales," published in 1609 and 1616, both affirmed that "the desert of Atacama formed part "of Chili," which is also asserted by the friar, Anello Olivia, who wrote one of the first histories of Peru.

(*b.*) In 1679, the Governour and Captain-General of Chili evidently exercised jurisdiction over the desert of Atacama, because petitions were presented to him in that year, praying for a grant of some land in the desert of Atacama, and he granted the concession asked for.

(*c.*) The map which Don Juan de Langara, secretary of the Spanish navy, in 1799, presented to the King of Spain as the result of the scientific mission of Post-Captain Don José Bustamante to the west coast of South America, shows clearly that the Morro of Mejillones, whereon afterwards the Chilians found guano, was by the royal authorities held to be part of the Spanish colony Chili, for on that chart the 23rd parallel of southern latitude most certainly passes through the territory which on said map is assigned to Chili.

(*d.*) Any other maps that placed the boundary of Chili as far south as where Paposo is situated, were held merely to have marked the boundary line of Chili proper, or that part in which judicial and other authorities existed, and to have taken no notice of simple dependencies like the desert, which then had no regular body of authorities, thus accounting for the difference between some of the old maps.

(*e.*) The royal decrees of 3rd of June, 1801, and 26th of June, 1803, order that Paposo (a Chilian port to which Bolivia never laid claim) be recognised as the Departmental Capital, or Cabecera, of the littoral and the interior of the desert of Atacama, subject, however, to the superior authorities of Santiago, who also appointed the judge of the desert of Atacama, which latter functionary resided in Paposo or the Bahia de Nuestra Señora.

(*f.*) When later on the Spanish American colonies declared their independence, the principle of *uti possedetis* was adopted, so that whatever was subject to the old jurisdiction of the Royal Captain-General of Chili, came *de jure* under the new authority of the Republic of Chili; and that the desert of Atacama *de facto* was submitted to the sovereignty of the Republic of Chili, I found proved by the circumstance that the Government of Prieto and Portales sent an expedition "to explore the littoral of "the Republic between Coquimbo and the "Morro de Mejillones," which expedition found guano in sixteen different places, and further by the fact that on the 31st December, 1842, the Chilian Congress passed the first Bill regulating the working of the guano deposits discovered in the desert of Atacama; furthermore, the archives of the Custom House of Valparaiso proved that from the year 1842 to 1857 not less than 113 vessels had tranquilly loaded guano on the coast of the desert of Atacama, with Chilian licenses, and been sent away to Europe with Chilian clearances.

(*g.*) It was proved that Bolivia admitted, by implication, that her authority did not extend further south than Cobija, for in 1833, Santa Cruz, the President of Bolivia, in reporting to Congress his trip to the littoral, speaks of Cobija as the "*only Bolivian* "*port*," and on other occasion, approves of a loan being raised to improve "*Cobija, the* "*only port of Bolivia.*"

(*h.*) That although the Bolivian authorities, ten years later than Santa Cruz's admission that Cobija was the only Bolivian port, raised a claim to the Port of Mejillones, soon after the Chilian discovery of guano, and occasionally repeated their pretensions, still the facts remain, first, that vessels loaded guano for fifteen years at Mejillones, Angamos, and Santamaria, under Chilian permits, cleared by Chilian Custom-house officers; and, secondly, that Chili, in 1866, concluded with Bolivia a solemn and binding treaty of limits, including a provision for the matter of dealing with the guano and nitrate deposits, mines, etc., in the Desert of Atacama, between the 23rd and 25th parallels. This treaty, moreover, the Bolivian President with whom it was made, admitted to me, was "a concession in favour of Bolivia, on "account of her not siding with Spain in the "war of 1865 to 1866, during which the "facility of having had the Bolivian Port "of Cobija to repair to, would have been "of immense advantage to the Spanish

"squadron when blockading the coast of "Chili."

Fourth.—Both Mr. Markham and Señor Garcia charge Chili with having been secretly preparing herself for a war with Bolivia and Peru, for the purpose of extending her territory at the expense of those two Republics, and that Chili knew all along the existence of their alliance, which is said to have caused her to purchase two formidable ironclads, and increase the effective force of her army. To this I must say, in the first place, that it is personally known to me that the two ironclads referred to, after some considerable delay and hesitation on account of their great cost, were ordered in consequence of the lesson taught Chili by the Spanish fleet in the Pacific, and also in consequence of the fears that were entertained that the difficulties with the Argentine Confederation might not end peaceably but result in a war, in which the Argentine ironclads would be more than a match for the insignificant Chilian navy, possessing only old-fashioned wooden vessels, some of which could not fire a salute without immediately having to man the pumps; and, in the second place, that it is a positive fact that the two Chilian ironclads, the only new vessels acquired in the decade preceding the war, were included in the budget of the Chilian Minister of the Navy and ordered, not only before any rumours were heard of the Peruvian and Bolivian alliance referred to, but even before the secret treaty between these two nations had been made; while, in the third place, Chilian Parliamentary papers prove that in December, 1878, a few months before the outbreak of the war, the Chilian Congress reduced considerably the annual budget, both of the Minister of the Navy and the Army-Department, retrenchment being the order of the day, as it in fact had been ever since the financial crisis of 1874, it being even suggested by part of the Press and by several Members of Congress that the greater part of the Navy should be sold.

The Chilian army, when the war broke out, was found to have been reduced from its normal strength of 3,573, the number fixed by Congress, to only 2,440 men and officers all told; whereas the Peruvian standing army consisted of 4,200 regular soldiers, 3,870 officers, the commissions of many of the latter being, however, simply *ad honorem*, and an armed police force of 5,400 men and officers, which, added to the standing army of Bolivia, 3,021 strong, gave a total of 11,001, without counting the 5,400 Peruvian police soldiers. Against such fearful odds, a small force of 2,440 Chilians had to prepare themselves to fight.

The population of the two allied republics amounted to 5.800,000, whereas Chili had a population of only 2.155,029, and about 50,000 Indians, so that both the original force and the chance of recruiting and increasing the respective armies were infinitely greater on the part of Bolivia and Peru than on that of Chili. Bolivia possessed not a single vessel; the navy of Peru, however, according to data furnished by the Peruvian Government for the Paris Exhibition of 1878, was superior to that of Chili, and cost £1.000,000 yearly to maintain, as against the sum of £350,000 which Chili spent per annum on her fleet; the former, the Peruvian navy, consisted of two good sea-going ironclads, two formidable monitors for harbour protection, two corvettes, and twelve smaller vessels, mounting in all sixty-six guns; while the Chilian navy counted two heavy, strong, though somewhat slow, ironclads, four wooden corvettes, two of which very old, one gun boat, and one *aviso*, mounting forty-two guns in all, thus inferior to the navy of Peru.

The returns of the Chilian Statistical Department show the utterly insignificant quantity of arms and ammunition that was imported by Chili from Europe and the United States in the five years preceding the outbreak of the war, and the letters of the Chilian legations, published in the Blue-Books, prove, to a certainty, how completely and unwarrantably unprepared Chili was for war in February, 1879, when she found herself obliged to assert her rights by force of arms, and face the two conspirators who, it appeared, had secretly been in league ever since February, 1873; for those communications show clearly that the Santiago Government, only after the declaration of war, started telegraphing and writing for war material, which, however, was then very difficult to procure, owing to the stringency of the laws of neutrality of Europe and the United States. At the same time, I do not agree with some of the Chilian writers who state that Peru and Bolivia were prepared for the war in question; for the latter republic, I am aware, confided blindly in her ally, who was supposed to be so infinitely stronger than Chili that no Chilian soldiers would ever

be able to land in Bolivia, and Peru had too much belief in Chili ultimately yielding to Bolivian demands to arm herself fully.

The mission of the Peruvian Minister, Lavalle, who denied all knowledge of the secret treaty, was, without a doubt, for the purpose of giving Peru time to prepare herself for war, and was only frustrated by Chili's decisive step of sending him his passports, and declaring war, as soon as the existence of the treaty was found to be a fact.

Fifth.—As regards the war operations themselves, it is hinted at that they have been successful on the part of Chili, because her vessels were chiefly commanded and officered either by Englishmen or by Chilians who had been in the English navy; but it would be wrong to lose sight of the fact that the Chilians themselves are good sailors, who, in times of peace are kept in constant practice by voyages along the littoral of Chili proper, by trips to her Northern Dependencies, to the adjacent islands over which she exercises sovereignty, and to her colony in the Straits of Magellan, or are employed on hydrographic service. Except two old officers who fought under Lord Cochrane, and who have been on the retired list for many years, the Chilian pay-sheets show plainly that there are none but Chilians amongst her naval officers. When the war commenced, only two of her officers, who were of English extraction, but sons of Chilian citizens, had served in the English navy for a number of years; one of them, Captain Simpson, however, resigned, and the other, Captain Lynch, who was considered to have retired from the sea, and who held the important office of Governor of the Coast District of the Province of Valparaiso, had again to go afloat, but in reality has been mostly employed on shore during this war; he commanded the First Division of the Chilian army that invested and took the capital of Peru, for his bravery on which occasion he was promoted to the rank of Admiral, and now serves as Military Governor of Lima, under a Minister, who in Peru represents the Chilian Government. This officer, before he entered the English navy, and took part in the capture of Canton, Chusan, Wampoo, and Nankuto, for which he received an English medal, had already served in the navy of his own country, Chili, and in 1838 fought before Callao; he had also taken part in several naval engagements in the Pacific before he joined the English navy in 1840. Lynch is, however, by Mr. Markham and the Peruvian diplomatist referred to, represented as a *cattle-lifter*, a *ringleader of miscreants*, an *Irish filibuster*, etc., probably to lead the readers to forget that he is a naval officer, who but obeys the orders of his superiors, and who is amenable to a court-martial, the same as any other military functionary.

The Chilians are by the ultra-philo Peruvians charged with cruelty in firing on the undefended towns of Iquique, Mollendo and Pisagua, and in not giving any quarter on taking Arica, as well as with destroying *smiling* villages and flourishing estates in other parts of Peru, besides with levying war contributions, but these matters every student of history and of international law will allow are incidental to every war, and can only be fitly judged by hearing the military commanders who are responsible for them. At the very beginning of the war the Chilian War Office furnished every commissioned officer with a printed copy of "War Instructions" based on Bello's and Bluntschli's Digests of International Law, and on the "Instructions for the Armies of the United States in Campaign," which a committee of North American officers drew up during the War of Secession, and which were approved of by President Lincoln's Government, while to every Chilian soldier and sailor was handed an excellent map with a brief description of the enemy's country, so that it is evident that the Chilian soldiers knew their obligations, and if any excesses were committed, you may depend on it that the parties responsible for same have had to pay the penalty of the military law. As regards the fleet firing on the towns mentioned, the Blue-Books contain the reports of Captain Robinson of H. M.'s Ship "Turquoise," and the European press has published the graphic account given by the special correspondent of the French newspaper, "Le Journal du Commerce Maritime et des Colonies," from which it is plainly seen that the Chilian commanders were very lenient, and only fired on State property, and more especially on the barracks and houses from which the Peruvian soldiers provoked them by harassing the crews of the Chilian vessels or their boats. It must also be remembered that both history and international law tell us that every bombardment is not a duel between armed vessels and shore batteries, but that sometimes a town is bombarded to force it to comply with something that a military

commander exacts, as was the case in 1807 with Copenhagen, which town was undefended on the side where a military commander, without war even having been declared, landed his artillery and kept up a bombardment for several days and nights, destroying public and private property, killing non-combatants, men, women and children, until the town capitulated and delivered up the Danish fleet, which it was feared would otherwise have benefitted Napoleon; while at other times an undefended town is bombarded to chastise the country it belongs to for some insult, or alleged insult, to the flag the bombarding vessels fly, as was the case at Valparaiso in 1866, when a Spanish squadron kept up an incessant fire for a whole day, destroying several millions worth of property, because the Chilian Government would not, or could not, apologise for the doings of some private citizens, but had referred the Spanish Minister to the Tribunals of the country; and have we not often in the Indian Ocean and the Western Pacific seen instances of European vessels of war shelling undefended savage places for acts of hostility, cruelty, or treachery committed?

The circumstance of the Chilians, on taking one of the batteries at Arica, not giving quarter, is, I fear, brought forward very maliciously; for it has several times been fully explained, that, when after a severe fight it was found that a great many Chilian soldiers continued to be killed wholesale, by mines of dynamite and powder, fired through wires from the hospital, which was sheltered by the flag of the red cross, then the Chilian officers could for some moments not restrain their soldiers, who, on storming the next fort, made "no more quarter" their battle cry, until at length their officers regained their usual control, and were able to save 60 officers and 300 men of the Peruvian garrison of that fort.

The Peruvian plan of the fortifications afterwards showed not less than eighty-four infernal machines distributed all round the outside of the fortifications; many of them did not explode, but still one can understand that the knowledge of the existence of these terrible engines of cruelly refined warfare, and the circumstance of the red cross being abused in the manner named, would in battle exasperate any soldier of whatever nation. When after the terrible battles before Lima, where the Peruvian infernal machines and automatic shore-torpedoes, distributed over the ground for miles, had played so formidable a part amongst the Peruvian means of defence, it became known to the Chilian troops that their general declared that the enemy had broken the armistice, and that later on, same day or the next, the houses of some *smiling* villages, referred to by Mr. Markham, were filled with Peruvian soldiers or other armed men, who kept on firing on the Chilian troops as they entered the villages alluded to, is it any wonder that the Chilian soldiers also then gave no quarter, and in some cases had to set fire to the houses, when all staircases had been destroyed and shots from the roofs continued to decimate the Chilian ranks? The plantation with the "pet dogs" and "valuable racing stud," described by Señor Garcia, and destroyed by orders of one of the Chilian commanders because a war contribution levied was not paid, it must be remembered, belonged to a Peruvian officer who had just organised a fresh battalion specially to harass the army of occupation, a personal friend of the Peruvian dictator Pierola, whom he had assisted, and was assisting in a variety of ways against Chili, with money derived from this very plantation; moreover, with Pierola's insulting "manifestos" fresh in mind, is it anything but natural that the Chilian officer in command should in this and even in other similar cases, in which the proprietors had shown marked hostility and rendered themselves personally obnoxious, inflict as a wholesome example, some punishment, by destroying their property, if the war contribution of money, or drafts demanded, were not paid, but, on the contrary, as was the case near Chimbote, refused in the most frivolous manner?

The statement that the Chilian soldiers carry knives for the express purpose of killing their wounded enemies, can hardly have been made in good faith; everyone knows how useful a knife is on any expedition; and in storming batteries made of bags of sand it is easy to imagine the important part that such an article plays. Even in the far North, on the Scandinavian peninsula, we find that every Norwegian soldier carries a specialty as his private property, his "tollekniv," the national sheath knife of Norway, worn by almost every Norwegian of whatever grade of society; but still I do not think it ever entered any one's mind that such an adjunct to the Scandinavian soldier's kit was for the purpose of killing wounded enemies (!)

Still, this latter is the office Mr. Markham assures one the Chilian knife is meant to perform. The extensive use of dynamite by the Peruvians in the war, the wholesale massacre accomplished by automatic infernal machines, both at their different seaports on and around their forts on shore, and placed on the roads they expected the Chilians would take, contrivances like the "explosive gig" and the "mechanical bumboat," that sent two Chilian men of war to the bottom almost with their entire crews, other, though mechanically ingenious, nevertheless, diabolical arrangements in the shape of saddles, hats, caps, watches, drinking cups, match boxes, etc., distributed about the ground, and arranged with a spring and a detonator to explode a charge of dynamite when lifted, instead of the employment of torpedoes of the recognised types, might well exasperate some of the Chilian soldiers sufficiently to a war *à l'outrance*, and neither give nor take quarter; but that a Chilian should have served out to him a knife to go round the battle field with and "polish off" the wounded Peruvians and Bolivians, is simply a gross calumny; besides on the other hand, official returns prove positively that several thousand Peruvian and Bolivian prisoners of war have been sent to Chili, instead of butchered with the long knives spoken of in Mr. Markham's "romance."

If Mr. Markham were an impartial historian, he would have considered that savage butchery would be more after the fashion of the soldiers of Peru and Bolivia, in which latter countries history records numerous murders of Presidents and high functionaries, coupled with incidents like the one above referred to of the brothers Gutierrez, who were hoisted up the spire of the Lima Cathedral—countries wherein a President is known to have threatened the British Chargé d'Affaires with personal violence and obliged him to leave Bolivia; another of the Presidents of which Republic, after amusing himself with practising rifle shooting on donkeys from the windows of the "Palacio," or Government House, even at state dinners would throw long knives at marks upon the wall of the dining-hall, placed close on either side of the head of the bandsmen, cautioning the generally terrified wretches not to move, and who is known at a diplomatic banquet to have torn off his coat a foreign decoration and thrown it at the head of the Minister for the nation that had sent him the order in question, telling his guest that a "republican wanted no monarchical baubles;" while he on another occasion left the dinner-table, went into the adjoining room, a shot was heard, which turned out to be "merely that one of the household had been killed by the President," who resumed his seat at the table as if nothing unusual had happened; and who on many occasions, when seeing in the street a lady whose looks pleased him, would send his soldiers by force to convey her to Government House, if she refused to come on other terms; nevertheless being tolerated without impeachment as the chief magistrate of the nation for nearly six years. Has Mr. Markham never seen the Peruvian newspapers published during the war? They ought to have revealed to him the savage instincts, not of the Chilians, but of the Peruvians, for nearly every paper published in Peru was continually full of the most demoralising articles, inciting the people to butcher the Chilians, and promising that "soon rivers of Chilian blood would run from the Andes to the sea, and bridges be made of Chilian corpses."

Sixth.—The circumstance of it having been said in the Chilian Congress by a Member of the Cabinet that the object of the war was to cripple Peru for a hundred years, is brought forward as an instance of Chili being a savage and uncivilised nation; but one may here ask Mr. Markham whether it is not always the object of a belligerent to cripple his enemy as effectually as possible, so as to prevent him from renewing his attacks, and so that peace may be enjoyed for as long a period as possible? Besides, we all know that what a Minister says in Parliament, when he wants his estimates passed, is not always exactly, to the very letter, what he means, and also that, in the heat of Parliamentary debates, sentiments are not unfrequently given expression to which, in a calmer mood would not have been uttered.

Seventh.—The most of the incidents mentioned by Señor Garcia as having taken place in Lima under the Chilian occupation, could not possibly have occurred in the manner he describes. To act as a check on the military governour, and prevent, as much as possible, such excesses as in times of war always occur in an enemy's country, the Chilian Government sent to Lima also a political governour, in the person of Don Jovino Novoa, who was a Minister in the Montt-Varas Cabinet, a man of calm judgment, who has been for many years a member of the Chilian Con-

gress, has filled the important office of Judge of Crime, who was Governor of the Province of Valparaiso. and who is one of the ablest barristers in South America.

The presence in Lima of this high functionary, whose father was a Justice of the Supreme Court, a man of real *sangre azul*, and who is also related to several of the oldest Peruvian families, is the best security that Chili possibly could give the civilised world in general, and the Chilian people in particular, that matters would be carried on in an orderly manner in Lima during the military occupation.

Eighth.—Chili is charged with not wishing to make peace, but the writer of these lines knows for a fact that the people of Chili and her Government are most anxious for peace, in order that the numerous citizens, who are only temporarily soldiers, may return to their homes and their usual avocations ; all are fully alive to the demoralisation and other evils brought about by a protracted war; and so sick and tired of the present sacrifice of Chilian blood is the Government of Santiago that they have lately, through the American Minister, foregone all claim on Peru for any pecuniary war indemnity, but, on the contrary, offered to pay 10.000,000 dollars for the strip of land from Arica to Tacna, Chili remaining with the Tarapaca district, which latter the "Times," in a sub-leader of the 1st instant recognises that Peru, in any case must give up. But the great difficulty is to get the different Peruvian factions to join sufficiently to get a Government firmly constituted, otherwise a treaty of peace cannot be valid and binding.

Señor Garcia could, no doubt, serve his country better by remaining at home and dedicating his talents as a diplomatist to bring about peace, than by amusing himself in London and Paris, and giving the public exaggerated and erroneous accounts of affairs on the west coast of South America.

A perusal of the diplomatic reports of Sir Horace Rumbold, the British consular reports, and the official dispatches from Captain Albert Markham, R.N., Commander Acland, R.N., Captain Robinson, R.N., and others; the contributions to the "Encyclopædia Britannica," under the heads of Chili, Peru, and Bolivia; the writings of French scientists like Rabutaux, in Block's "Dictionnaire Générale de Politique;" the special articles in Larousse's "Grand Dictionnaire;" Count d'Ursel's "Sud Amerique, Sejour et Voyages;" and M. Wiener's "Perou et Bolivie;" as well as the two volumes of "Histoire de la Guerre du Pacifique," by Arana, would no doubt give the public a very different opinion of the three countries referred to from that which Mr. Clements Markham and Señor Garcia endeavour to instil into the minds of people whom they can influence by their writings.

I am, Sir, your obedient Servant,

AN OLD WEST-COASTER.

WESTMINSTER CHAMBERS,
VICTORIA STREET, LONDON, S.W.
May 12th, 1883. (*Card enclosed.*)

Almost at the same time that the above letter was written, appeared the following review of Mr. Markham's book about the War in the Pacific ;—

"THE WAR BETWEEN PERU AND CHILI, 1879-1882." By Clements R. Markham, C.B., F.R.S. One vol. (*Sampson Low, Marston, Searle, and Rivington.*)—Although the war between the two Pacific Republics of South America cannot be said to have yet ended, it began four years ago, and there has been plenty of time for its history to be written. This is the task Mr. Clements Markham now essays, and in many respects he is well qualified for its performance. But his readers should not be in haste to accept his judgment unreservedly. From the very first he adopts the Peruvian view, and contends that it was Chili who forced on the war, on shallow pretexts, for purposes of aggression. This theory is not, we think, in accordance with historical fact. The Chilians certainly declared war at last, but they were influenced to do so by the very evident purpose of Peru and Bolivia to keep the nitrate fields of Tarapaca for themselves. Another just cause of umbrage to the Southern Republic was the secret treaty executed by her two Northern neighbours some time previously. Mr. Markham shows that the Chilian Government must have known of this compact long before hostilities began, and, although it affected to be of a purely defensive character, the aggressive spirit exhibited by Peru and Bolivia after its signature left little room for doubting that they considered it to cover offensive proceedings as well. The partisan spirit shown by the author in this matter unfortunately dominates

his judgment throughout the book. He represents that while Chili had been treacherously strengthening her navy, Peru did nothing to develop her maritime strength. As a matter of fact the northern Republic believed that it was fully equal to the Southern on the sea, and if for some years it had ceased to spend money on its navy, that was simply because its rulers squandered the enormous profits from the guano beds on other objects. Mr. Markham admits that the Chilian infantry are "good fighting machines," but he charges both that arm and the cavalry with butchering wounded enemies, and with not giving quarter. We do not believe that there are any substantial grounds for these sweeping accusations. Isolated instances of savagery may have occurred, and it is quite possible that the Chilian soldiery are prone to plunder. Not less opposed to the historic spirit is the author's attempt to show that the Chilians exceeded the laws of civilised warfare by bombarding defenceless towns. The case of Pisagua is cited in proof, but on analysing the facts it comes out that the garrison and inhabitants kept up as hot a fire as they could until the Chilian fleet withdrew. As for the statement that "neutral flags, displayed from some houses, were disregarded," it is merely necessary to say that during hot bombardments shot and shell frequently fly off at a tangent after ricochetting, and hit objects far from the line of aim. This happened at the bombardment of Alexandria, and Mr. Markham might as well lay the blame for the resulting damage on the commanders of our ironclads as seek to make the Chilians responsible for what happened at Pisagua. In the graphic account of the fight between the Huascar and the Chilian fleet, incidental mention is made of a fact which goes some way to disprove these charges of inhumanity. After being heavily battered for some time by the Cochrane and the Blanco, the Huascar had her flag halliards shot away, and down came her ensign. Instantly the Chilian fire ceased, and it was not renewed until the Peruvian ram ran up fresh colours. On this occasion the Peruvians fought most gallantly, perhaps owing in some measure to the example of the 30 Englishmen who formed part of the Huascar's crew. But with all deference to Mr. Markham, we do not think that their land forces had much heroism in them. It is, too, odd sort of praise to bestow on General Buendia, who commanded at Tarapaca, that "although he was sometimes inert and at others rash, he never failed in personal courage when the time for fighting came." A commander of that sort is certainly an encumbrance to any army, but Mr. Markham seems to think that the attribute of personal bravery atoned for the other defects in a general who was a Peruvian. We might quote from almost every page to prove the animus of the author against the other side. "The worst of the old conquerors," he writes on one occasion, "sought for gold; their Chilian imitators wanted to appropriate manure." In the description of the landing at Pisagua, a very gallant achievement, ably carried out, he affirms that "most of the Chilian wounded died of neglect." We should much like to know the authority for this scandalous aspersion on the humanity of the Chilian officers. On the other hand, the heroism of the Peruvians and Bolivians is painted in the most glowing colours. Mr. Markham actually appears to believe that at the battle of San Francisco one Peruvian division "received 112 shots from each man of the regiment that assailed them, and 80 shots from the artillery" during a brief advance. If this was really so, it can only be said that Chilian marksmanship must be astonishingly bad, as the entire casualties in the whole Peruvian army on this occasion did not amount to 300. But it is unnecessary to multiply instances of the unhistoric spirit in which this so-called history is compiled. English judgment long ago came to the conclusion that Chili had right on her side when she took up arms against the allied northern republics, and this verdict is not likely to be set aside by such partisan advocacy as that of Mr. Markham. If he and other friends of Peru used their influence to induce her to accept and carry out the terms of peace offered by the Chilians it would be a far more friendly proceeding than the publication of books glorifying the conquered and depreciating the conquerors.—*The Globe*, London, 11th May, 1883.

The Editor of a London weekly makes the following remarks, viz. :—

Admiral Garcia, of the Peruvian Navy, has written to the *Times* to protest against the cruelties of the Chilians, and to announce the Peruvians' determination not to assent to reasonable terms of peace. The Admiral, as his country is engaged in war, would be better employed in fighting her enemies than in inditing letters from Paris complaining of them; or, if he objects to fighting, he might betake himself home with the horde of Peruvians now in Paris, in order to attempt to re-establish some sort of order in that distracted Republic. The Chilians are decent, orderly people, who never desired to fall out with their neighbours. The Peruvians forced the war upon them. At present, the difficulty is that there is no Government in Peru with whom it is possible to negotiate. The country is overrun by guerilla bands of Peruvians, who pillage friend and foe alike. Let the Peruvians organise themselves into some sort of civilized Government, and offer such terms of peace as their victors can reasonably accept. So far as the Chilians are concerned, they are a commercial nation. They fight when they are obliged to, but they have no passion for fighting; and they would be exceedingly glad to live in peace and amity with the Peruvians and everybody else.—*Truth*, 17th May, 1883.

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